HelloBooks / Agents

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31 public endpoints43 MCP tools491 accounting operations

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Authenticated accounting

Create vendorPrepaymentSchedule record(s)

POST /public/v1/orgs/{orgId}/entities/{entityId}/vendorPrepaymentSchedule

Mounted by the generic resource factory in `routes/publicApi.routes.js` from the registry row `vendorPrepaymentSchedule` in `routes/publicApi.resources.js`. The request is delegated to the SAME internal controller a signed-in user hits (`controllers/GRPC/Accounting/vendorPrepaymentSchedule.grpc` → `createVendorPrepaymentSchedule`), so it inherits that controller's validation, server-side tax computation and audit trail. Guards applied, in order: bearer token (`marketplace_app` audience) → plan API-access entitlement → rate limit → AI-credit metering → permission context of the installing user → tenant path match → `requireScope("purchases:write")`.

OAuth 2.0; company authorization and operation scopes required

Authenticated accounting

Update vendorPrepaymentSchedule record(s)

PUT /public/v1/orgs/{orgId}/entities/{entityId}/vendorPrepaymentSchedule

Mounted by the generic resource factory in `routes/publicApi.routes.js` from the registry row `vendorPrepaymentSchedule` in `routes/publicApi.resources.js`. The request is delegated to the SAME internal controller a signed-in user hits (`controllers/GRPC/Accounting/vendorPrepaymentSchedule.grpc` → `updateVendorPrepaymentSchedule`), so it inherits that controller's validation, server-side tax computation and audit trail. Guards applied, in order: bearer token (`marketplace_app` audience) → plan API-access entitlement → rate limit → AI-credit metering → permission context of the installing user → tenant path match → `requireScope("purchases:write")`.

OAuth 2.0; company authorization and operation scopes required

Authenticated accounting

Delete vendorPrepaymentSchedule record(s)

DELETE /public/v1/orgs/{orgId}/entities/{entityId}/vendorPrepaymentSchedule

Mounted by the generic resource factory in `routes/publicApi.routes.js` from the registry row `vendorPrepaymentSchedule` in `routes/publicApi.resources.js`. The request is delegated to the SAME internal controller a signed-in user hits (`controllers/GRPC/Accounting/vendorPrepaymentSchedule.grpc` → `deleteVendorPrepaymentSchedule`), so it inherits that controller's validation, server-side tax computation and audit trail. Guards applied, in order: bearer token (`marketplace_app` audience) → plan API-access entitlement → rate limit → AI-credit metering → permission context of the installing user → tenant path match → `requireScope("purchases:write")`.

OAuth 2.0; company authorization and operation scopes required

Authenticated accounting

Fetch one vendorPrepaymentSchedule record by id

GET /public/v1/orgs/{orgId}/entities/{entityId}/vendorPrepaymentSchedule/{id}

Mounted by the generic resource factory in `routes/publicApi.routes.js` from the registry row `vendorPrepaymentSchedule` in `routes/publicApi.resources.js`. The request is delegated to the SAME internal controller a signed-in user hits (`controllers/GRPC/Accounting/vendorPrepaymentSchedule.grpc` → `getVendorPrepaymentScheduleById`), so it inherits that controller's validation, server-side tax computation and audit trail. Guards applied, in order: bearer token (`marketplace_app` audience) → plan API-access entitlement → rate limit → AI-credit metering → permission context of the installing user → tenant path match → `requireScope("purchases:read")`.

OAuth 2.0; company authorization and operation scopes required

Authenticated accounting

Create a webhook subscription

POST /public/v1/orgs/{orgId}/entities/{entityId}/webhooks

Subscription CRUD is live. Delivery is currently dormant — a subscription created here is recorded and does not yet produce callbacks. DECLARED FIELD-CONTRACT GAP: this route is listed in `UNCONTRACTED_ROUTE_PREFIXES` in `middlewares/publicApiSerialize.middleware.js`. The response field allowlist does not apply to it; only the deny-key floor does. It is named here rather than omitted. LEGACY EXEMPTION. This endpoint shipped with no scope guard at all, so it is gated by `requireScopeOrLegacyGrant`: the scope above is required of any token that carries granular public-API scopes, and a token that carries NONE of them is admitted unchanged. That preserves access for every install issued before the vocabulary existed and for installs on unrelated scope vocabularies. The exemption is pinned to this exact set of endpoints, not to the scope — a NEW webhook route is a new capability and is gated by plain `requireScope`. It is not expressible as an OpenAPI security requirement, so it is recorded here and in `x-hellobooks-legacy-grandfathered`; a new client should request the scope in `security` and will always be authorized.

OAuth 2.0; company authorization and operation scopes required

Authenticated accounting

List this app's webhook subscriptions

GET /public/v1/orgs/{orgId}/entities/{entityId}/webhooks

See the POST for the delivery caveat. DECLARED FIELD-CONTRACT GAP: this route is listed in `UNCONTRACTED_ROUTE_PREFIXES` in `middlewares/publicApiSerialize.middleware.js`. The response field allowlist does not apply to it; only the deny-key floor does. It is named here rather than omitted. LEGACY EXEMPTION. This endpoint shipped with no scope guard at all, so it is gated by `requireScopeOrLegacyGrant`: the scope above is required of any token that carries granular public-API scopes, and a token that carries NONE of them is admitted unchanged. That preserves access for every install issued before the vocabulary existed and for installs on unrelated scope vocabularies. The exemption is pinned to this exact set of endpoints, not to the scope — a NEW webhook route is a new capability and is gated by plain `requireScope`. It is not expressible as an OpenAPI security requirement, so it is recorded here and in `x-hellobooks-legacy-grandfathered`; a new client should request the scope in `security` and will always be authorized.

OAuth 2.0; company authorization and operation scopes required

Authenticated accounting

List webhook delivery attempts

GET /public/v1/orgs/{orgId}/entities/{entityId}/webhooks/deliveries

The delivery log for this install's subscriptions. Install-ownership is enforced in the data layer, so a caller only ever sees its own deliveries; the scope answers the separate question of whether the grant may act at all. DECLARED FIELD-CONTRACT GAP: this route is listed in `UNCONTRACTED_ROUTE_PREFIXES` in `middlewares/publicApiSerialize.middleware.js`. The response field allowlist does not apply to it; only the deny-key floor does. It is named here rather than omitted.

OAuth 2.0; company authorization and operation scopes required

Authenticated accounting

Purge pending deliveries

POST /public/v1/orgs/{orgId}/entities/{entityId}/webhooks/deliveries/purge

Destroys queued deliveries that have not been sent. Write-scoped rather than read-scoped precisely because it destroys work: a read-only integration must not reach it even against its own endpoint. DECLARED FIELD-CONTRACT GAP: this route is listed in `UNCONTRACTED_ROUTE_PREFIXES` in `middlewares/publicApiSerialize.middleware.js`. The response field allowlist does not apply to it; only the deny-key floor does. It is named here rather than omitted.

OAuth 2.0; company authorization and operation scopes required

Authenticated accounting

Fetch one delivery attempt

GET /public/v1/orgs/{orgId}/entities/{entityId}/webhooks/deliveries/{deliveryId}

Full detail for a single delivery, including the stored response snippet. Registered after the literal `deliveries` routes in the source so that segment cannot be captured as an id. DECLARED FIELD-CONTRACT GAP: this route is listed in `UNCONTRACTED_ROUTE_PREFIXES` in `middlewares/publicApiSerialize.middleware.js`. The response field allowlist does not apply to it; only the deny-key floor does. It is named here rather than omitted.

OAuth 2.0; company authorization and operation scopes required

Authenticated accounting

Replay a delivery

POST /public/v1/orgs/{orgId}/entities/{entityId}/webhooks/deliveries/{deliveryId}/replay

Causes a real outbound POST from HelloBooks infrastructure to the subscription endpoint, which is why it requires the write scope. DECLARED FIELD-CONTRACT GAP: this route is listed in `UNCONTRACTED_ROUTE_PREFIXES` in `middlewares/publicApiSerialize.middleware.js`. The response field allowlist does not apply to it; only the deny-key floor does. It is named here rather than omitted.

OAuth 2.0; company authorization and operation scopes required

Authenticated accounting

List every subscribable topic

GET /public/v1/orgs/{orgId}/entities/{entityId}/webhooks/topics

The catalogue registration validates against. Subscribing to a topic outside this list is rejected with a 400, so this is where the legal spelling comes from — the rejection can tell you a topic is wrong but not what is right. Derived from the same resource registry that mounts the write routes, so it cannot drift from what actually emits. `first_party_writes_emit` reports whether edits made INSIDE HelloBooks also emit on this deployment. It is a deployment switch, not a property of your app, and it is off by default — read it rather than assuming either answer. DECLARED FIELD-CONTRACT GAP: this route is listed in `UNCONTRACTED_ROUTE_PREFIXES` in `middlewares/publicApiSerialize.middleware.js`. The response field allowlist does not apply to it; only the deny-key floor does. It is named here rather than omitted.

OAuth 2.0; company authorization and operation scopes required

Authenticated accounting

Delete a webhook subscription

DELETE /public/v1/orgs/{orgId}/entities/{entityId}/webhooks/{id}

See the POST for the delivery caveat. DECLARED FIELD-CONTRACT GAP: this route is listed in `UNCONTRACTED_ROUTE_PREFIXES` in `middlewares/publicApiSerialize.middleware.js`. The response field allowlist does not apply to it; only the deny-key floor does. It is named here rather than omitted. LEGACY EXEMPTION. This endpoint shipped with no scope guard at all, so it is gated by `requireScopeOrLegacyGrant`: the scope above is required of any token that carries granular public-API scopes, and a token that carries NONE of them is admitted unchanged. That preserves access for every install issued before the vocabulary existed and for installs on unrelated scope vocabularies. The exemption is pinned to this exact set of endpoints, not to the scope — a NEW webhook route is a new capability and is gated by plain `requireScope`. It is not expressible as an OpenAPI security requirement, so it is recorded here and in `x-hellobooks-legacy-grandfathered`; a new client should request the scope in `security` and will always be authorized.

OAuth 2.0; company authorization and operation scopes required

Authenticated accounting

Fetch events for a pull-mode subscription

GET /public/v1/orgs/{orgId}/entities/{entityId}/webhooks/{id}/events

Cursor-based and NON-CONSUMING. `after` is the last `delivery_id` you successfully handled; everything newer comes back, oldest first. Asking again with the same cursor returns the same events — which is the point: an app that crashes between fetching and handling has lost nothing, where a fetch-and-consume queue would have dropped that event silently. At-least-once, with a stable `event_id` to de-duplicate on. That is the same contract push mode has. Each event carries the `headers` a push delivery would have carried, signed at THIS handover rather than when the event was recorded — an event that waited six minutes in the queue would otherwise arrive already outside the five-minute freshness window, and a correctly written receiver would reject its own first event. So verification code written against this endpoint is the code that runs in production. `next_cursor` is absent-as-unchanged on an empty page: a poller holds its existing cursor rather than resetting to the start of the queue. 409 if the subscription is push mode — its events were POSTed to `target_url`, so read them from the delivery log instead. 404 if no such subscription belongs to this app. DECLARED FIELD-CONTRACT GAP: this route is listed in `UNCONTRACTED_ROUTE_PREFIXES` in `middlewares/publicApiSerialize.middleware.js`. The response field allowlist does not apply to it; only the deny-key floor does. It is named here rather than omitted.

OAuth 2.0; company authorization and operation scopes required

Authenticated accounting

Send a test event

POST /public/v1/orgs/{orgId}/entities/{entityId}/webhooks/{id}/test

Sends a synthetic event to the subscription endpoint — a real outbound POST, hence the write scope. DECLARED FIELD-CONTRACT GAP: this route is listed in `UNCONTRACTED_ROUTE_PREFIXES` in `middlewares/publicApiSerialize.middleware.js`. The response field allowlist does not apply to it; only the deny-key floor does. It is named here rather than omitted.

OAuth 2.0; company authorization and operation scopes required

Authenticated accounting

Re-run the intent-to-receive handshake

POST /public/v1/orgs/{orgId}/entities/{entityId}/webhooks/{id}/verify

Re-verifies that the subscription endpoint answers the intent-to-receive challenge. Write-scoped: it calls out to the endpoint. DECLARED FIELD-CONTRACT GAP: this route is listed in `UNCONTRACTED_ROUTE_PREFIXES` in `middlewares/publicApiSerialize.middleware.js`. The response field allowlist does not apply to it; only the deny-key floor does. It is named here rather than omitted.

OAuth 2.0; company authorization and operation scopes required